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Challenging the Raison d’etre of 
Internal Devaluation in the 
Context of the Greek Economy 
 
Summary: This paper provides a critical assessment of the austerity measures
that are being implemented in the crisis-stricken countries of the Eurozone, and 
in particular, the implications of internal devaluation for the Greek economy.
The theoretical underpinnings and phases of internal devaluation are explored.
A detailed statistical analysis of key macroeconomic indicators pertaining to the
Greek economy is carried out. Alternatives to internal devaluation are proposed
in this paper, laying the foundations for a reassessment of the policy of auster-
ity and the implications for recovery and sustainability of economic activity in 
Greece and other countries of the Eurozone.
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Ostensibly, the ongoing implementation of austerity measures in the Eurozone has 
contributed significantly to the dismal economic performance of the region as a 
whole, particularly in terms of the sustained increase in the unemployment rate, 
reaching more than 12% by the beginning of 2013. Most economists and commenta-
tors expect the economic outlook to remain depressed for the foreseeable future, giv-
ing rise to the likelihood of a “Lost Decade” and, for the worst hit countries in 
Southern Europe, a “Lost Generation”. The hoped-for benefits that are expected to be 
reaped from the austerity measures are and will continue to be frittered away, due in 
the main to the deepening and lengthening of the economic recession.  
In Greece, the expected adverse impact of what is known as “internal devalua-
tion”, which commenced in 2012, has already taken its toll - according to the Greek 
Institute of Labour Studies (2012), within only six months from the implementation 
of this policy, the economy sharply contracted. Similar shrinkage in economic activ-
ity was also experienced by Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland as these countries have 
been following a similar policy. 
The main objective of this paper is to challenge the theoretical underpinnings 
and the expected impact of the internal devaluation policy being pursued by Greece 
under the austerity framework that has been enforced on the country by the so-called 
“troika” (European Central Bank – ECB, European Commission – EC and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund – IMF). In Section 1, we explain the theoretical context under-
pinning the rationale for austerity, while in Section 2 we set out the raison d’etre of 
internal devaluation. This is followed in Section 3 by a detailed empirical analysis of 
key macroeconomic indicators both prior to and since the onset of the financial crisis 
in order to assess the economic impact of internal devaluation. Section 4 puts for-
ward alternatives to internal devaluation, providing a platform for debate concerning  
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the future direction of policy, both in Greece and across the Eurozone as a whole, in 
relation to stability of the financial system combined with recovery and sustainability 
of economic growth. Finally, Section 5 brings together the key points and summa-
rizes the main conclusions. 
 
1. The Theoretical Context of Austerity Policy 
 
In the Traite de la Circulation et du Credit in 1761, Isaac de Pinto (1774) was one of 
the first to contribute to the debate about the potentially beneficial effects of govern-
ment spending by arguing that national debt and stock market speculation in securi-
ties played an instrumental role in fostering credit, thus increasing the circulation of 
money and promoting economic prosperity. In stark contrast, David Hume (1752) 
and Adam Smith (1776) were of the view that debt financing was associated with 
profligate government spending which in the long run would burden future genera-
tions of taxpayers. In the same line of argument David Ricardo referred to debt as 
one of the worst afflictions a nation can be exposed to. On a different note, Thomas 
Malthus (1836) seconded that those living on the interest from the national debt 
“contribute powerfully to distribution and demand … they ensure effective consump-
tion, which is necessary to give the proper stimulus to production”.  
  Prior to the publication of the General Theory in 1936, John Maynard 
Keynes (as well as the majority of the economic thinkers of his time) shared the view 
that savings determined the level of investment and that monetary policy was the 
preferred approach for dealing with economic fluctuations. In the Preface of The 
General Theory, Keynes reconsidered his initial position by writing “I, myself, held 
with conviction for many years the theories which I now attack, and I am not, I think, 
ignorant of their strong points. The composition of this book has been … a struggle 
to escape from habitual modes of thought and expression. … The difficulty lies not 
in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify for those brought 
up as most of us have been to every corner of our minds” (John M. Keynes 1936). 
  During the Great Depression of the 1930s, government deficits were re-
garded as economically beneficial during the slump, when the private sector was 
constrained and unable to stimulate effective demand to pull the economy out of de-
pression. It was in this sense that austerity came into prominence as a policy instru-
ment, which could be used at the peak of the business cycle to protect the economy 
from spiraling inflation. In the years that followed and more specifically during the 
“stagflationary” crises of the 1970s as well as during the decades preceding the 
2007/2008 crisis, austerity was regarded as a policy prescription when the economy 
was at the “trough” of the business cycle, at the point when the excesses of a bubble-
inflated boom had been revealed by its collapse (Suzanne J. Konzelmann 2012). In 
the aftermath of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, however, austerity has evolved into 
an economic concept that is strongly associated with credible governments who are 
single minded about eradicating their deficits, paying back their debts, as well as pro-
tecting the financial interests of investors in sovereign debt. 
  Broadly speaking, economic austerity involves some combination of public 
expenditure reductions and increased taxes in so far as it aims at reducing a country’s 
budget deficit and national debt. It is in this sense that financing public deficits has  
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economic, social and political consequences of its own and therefore the impact of 
austerity measures cannot be analyzed in a context other than that of social and po-
litical. Proponents of a policy of austerity tend to rest their case on the principles of 
export-led growth in that economic growth is contingent upon improving competi-
tiveness as well as attracting foreign direct investment. Hence, it is argued by these 
proponents that the only way forward for the crisis-hit countries in the Eurozone is to 
take quite drastic measures, such as: the privatization of public enterprises and agen-
cies, wage and pension cuts, layoffs of public employees, the contraction of the wel-
fare state, deregulation of the labour markets and the weakening of the trade unions. 
It is worth noting that such severe contractionary policies were already in 
place in Greece during the period 2009-2012, but they failed to deliver, in that both 
the competitive position of the economy and the inflows of foreign capital deterio-
rated even further. Contrary to what was expected, GDP over the period fell by 22%, 
the poverty level increased by a third to around 30% and the level of unemployment 
increased alarmingly, reaching more than 27% (Eurostat 2012).  
Given the ongoing economic crisis in Southern Europe, which is being exac-
erbated by internal devaluation (see Section 2), a number of economists argue that a 
strong institution such as the ECB should have stepped in from the outset to deal 
with the crisis by underwriting all European sovereign debt, thus providing vital 
breathing space to the already crippled economies. In this context, it is worth noting 
that the sum total of the national deficits and debts of the worst affected countries are 
still comparable to the corresponding levels that have been reported by the USA and 
Japan (Paul J. Fitoussi 2012). 
 Within the E region, with the exception of the UK and the Czech Republic, all 
countries have concurred to the dogmatic implementation of fiscal consolidation 
along the lines proposed by the institutions at the heart of European policy making - 
the ECB and the EC - in an attempt to deal with the debt crisis. This consolidation 
has been most pronounced in those Eurozone member states most significantly af-
fected by the crisis. The inevitable loss by Eurozone countries in terms of the inevi-
table loss of control over monetary policy and exchange rates, in conjunction with 
the absence of a common fiscal authority to smooth out the business cycles, has 
made overcoming asymmetric demand-side shocks very painful (Casimir Dadak 
2011).  
The International Monetary Fund (2012a) has produced estimates of actual 
and forecast changes in the cyclically adjusted fiscal balances for a number of coun-
tries in the EU, all of which have embarked on austerity measures. In the period 
2009-2014, in the case of the four most affected countries, the IMF predicts that the 
required restructuring (reduction) of the General Government Fiscal Balance will 
have to amount to more than 17% of potential GDP in Greece and 11%, 9.7% and 
8% in the cases of Ireland, Portugal and Spain respectively. This contrasts with a 
restructuring in the Netherlands and Germany of only 1.2% and 0.6% respectively. 
Not surprisingly, the notion that the revival of sustained economic growth is contin-
gent upon such a relentless contraction of the most severely affected economies on 
the basis of achieving balanced fiscal budgets has recently come in for a lot of criti-
cism (Claire Jones and Norma Cohen 2012). Furthermore, critics of Eurozone institu- 
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tions and policies have highlighted the potential costs of prolonged fiscal tightening 
(see for instance Jan Kregel 2012; Dimitri Papadimitriou and Randal Wray 2012). 
More specifically, according to Alvin Hansen and Papadimitriou (2012), “the current 
situation in Europe involves a self-defeating cycle of tight fiscal policies and low 
growth rates. We call this cycle of fiscal reduction and economic contraction a ‘fiscal 
trap’ to emphasize its self-reinforcing dynamics. Though the concept of a fiscal trap 
is not new, our version of this concept differs greatly from orthodox accounts of re-
cent economic crises around the world” (p. 4). 
In a similar vein, Martin Feldstein (2012) questions the efficacy of the internal 
devaluation policy orientation. He argues that the new fiscal discipline does not 
guarantee a smooth transition of the EU member states from recession to growth, in 
so far as it completely abandons the idea of the transfer of resources amongst the 
member states - thus effectively undermining the possibility of any progress towards 
a fiscal union. In the same line of argument, Kregel (2012) and Papadimitriou and 
Wray (2012) stress that the impact of ongoing fiscal tightening in the Eurozone will 
be severe and will haunt the region for many years to come. Jorge Uxó, Jesus Paúl, 
and Eladio Febrero (2011) add weight to this line of argument, stressing that the on-
going austerity policy in the Eurozone periphery will not solve the short-term eco-
nomic crisis but instead will exacerbate the situation in terms of a negative shock in 
aggregate demand, thus threatening the ability of the peripheral economies to settle 
their debts for many years to come.  
On a different note, Robert Boyer (2012) maintains that the widely imple-
mented austerity measures are fallacious. More specifically, he challenges the con-
ventional wisdom by firstly arguing that the main culprit for the present crisis is not 
the lax public spending policy pursued by governments over the years but the private 
credit-led speculative boom. Second, he posits that the assumption of the so-called 
“expansionary fiscal contractions” totally underestimates the short-term impact on 
domestic demand whilst overestimating the effects of the Ricardian equivalence, the 
“crowd in” effects resulting from lower interest rates as well as the positive impact 
on trade balances. Third, he regards the “one size fits all” approach as inherently 
problematic as the decimated peripheral economies of the Eurozone do not have the 
institutional nor political stamina to emulate the German success. The fourth fallacy 
according to Boyer (2012) is that the spillover from one country to another may pre-
cipitate the controversial “beggar my neighbour” policies from the interwar period. 
Additional pressure on the EU member states to pursue further austerity expe-
dients has also been exerted by the so-called “markets” in an attempt to make the 
crisis-hit countries accept harsher conditions should they want access to liquidity in 
the future. The emergence of the new economic environment that is starting to take 
shape in the EU region is characterized by the institutionalization of an internal de-
valuation policy orientation - devoid of any substantive measures to support future 
economic growth and job creation - that in all likelihood is destined to sink the pe-
ripheral economies into further and prolonged economic and social misery. 
Some observers vehemently argue that the incumbent think tanks of the Euro-
pean establishment should dispose of their obsession of indiscriminately applying 
fiscal discipline across the EU region and instead channel their efforts towards the  
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development of an alternative framework with the objective of supporting economic 
growth, innovation, employment, income redistribution and welfare state reconstitu-
tion. 
 
2. The Raison d’etre of Internal Devaluation 
 
The theoretical underpinnings of the policy of internal devaluation are predicated 
upon an adjustment mechanism that is supposed to kick in once the economy has 
veered off its equilibrium growth path. This mechanism is known as the channel of 
price competitiveness (or simply competitiveness channel) that consists of the proc-
ess of wage setting, the process of price setting, as well as the impact of price com-
petitiveness on exports and, hence, on the overall level of spending in the economy. 
In other words, an economy can improve its price competitiveness on the basis of 
internal devaluation by reducing the level of real or nominal wages with positive 
spillover effects on its exports and aggregate demand. With sufficient spare capacity 
present, a stimulus to demand can be expected to result in an increase in overall pro-
duction and reduce unemployment, driving the economy towards a new equilibrium 
level associated with stable inflation (on a par with the inflation rate prevailing in 
competing countries) as well as an improved balance of payments situation. 
In view of the above, the critics of internal devaluation focus on the efficacy 
of the competitiveness channel to restore equilibrium following an adverse shock. A 
general definition of competitiveness is provided by George Hatsopoulos, Paul 
Krugman, and Lawrence Summers (1988) on the basis of which competitiveness is 
the ability of a country to balance its foreign trade, whilst achieving a higher standard 
of living. A more precise and lucid definition suggests that structural competitiveness 
of a country is the maximum level of production (or the minimum rate of unemploy-
ment) that the country can achieve subject to two simultaneous constraints: firstly, 
the rate of inflation is kept constant and equal to the inflation rate experienced by 
competing countries and, second, the external account should be balanced (or posi-
tive, to cover any pending interest payment obligations of the country).  
The first constraint is often referred to in the literature as achieving internal 
balance, while the second as achieving external balance. The conceptualization of 
this theoretical framework is the result of work by John Williamson (1985, 1993, 
2009) who in 1983 developed the concept of the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange 
Rate (FEER) to describe the situation where the real exchange rate corresponds to 
some natural level of production and a sustainable current account deficit or surplus. 
According to Jan Hansen and Warner Roeger (2000) and Rebecca Driver and Peter 
Westaway (2004), the equilibrium exchange rate envisaged by Williamson is that 
which corresponds to the so-called NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Un-
employment) point that can be established under the open economy theoretical 
analysis. 
Extensive literature in mainstream economic theory strongly suggests that the 
combination of high levels of production (or low unemployment) and stable inflation 
requires substantial reforms in the labour market, most of which are directly linked to 
the economic underpinnings of internal devaluation. Such reforms relate to the 
minimum wage, the legislative and institutional framework within which workers’  
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rights are enshrined, the collective bargaining framework, the amount and duration of 
unemployment benefits, the working time etc. (for more on this see Richard Layard, 
Stephen Nickell, and Richard Jackman 1991; Charles Bean 1998; Layard and Nickell 
1998; Nickell 1998; IMF 1999; Tito Boeri, Layard, and Nickell 2000; IMF 2003; 
Nickel, Luca Nunziata, and Wolfgang Ochel 2005). According to the advocates of 
this mainstream approach, the required labour market structural reforms will ensure 
that downward pressure is exerted on wages, thus increasing the ability of the econ-
omy to achieve the desired level of production consistent with stable inflation. In 
other words, structural changes are supposed to enhance the efficacy of the adjust-
ment of the economy through the channel of price competitiveness. However, this 
internal devaluation approach to adjustment fails to appreciate the significance of the 
structural competitiveness permeating the extant production systems as well as the 
main characteristics of contemporary markets.  
In contrast to the internal devaluation approach to adjustment, alternative and 
heterodox economists, from an Anglo-Saxon perspective, attempt to shed light on the 
concept of competitiveness by emphasizing the importance of non-price structural 
supply-side factors such as: strengthening the capacity of the economy, the accumu-
lation of productive capital, the improvement in the country’s specialization in inter-
national trade, the adjustment of the production system to the demands of interna-
tional competition, product quality etc. - see inter alia Anthony Thirlwall (1979), Jan 
Fagerberg (1988), John McCombie (1993), McCombie and Thirlwall (1994), Robert 
Rowthorn (1995), Fagerberg (1996), Robert Blecker (1998), Isabelle Bensidoun, 
Guillaume Gualier, and Deniz Ünal-Kesenci (2001), Wendy Carlin, Andrew Glyn, 
and John Van Reenen (2001), Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001), Philip Arestis 
and Malcom Sawyer (2005), Engelbert Stockhammer (2008), Gustavo Britto and 
McCombie (2009). 
Nicholas Kaldor (1978) was amongst the first to stress the importance of 
structural factors in determining the competitiveness of a country’s performance in 
international competition highlighting, for example, product quality, technological 
innovation as well as the geographical orientation of exports affecting the income 
and price elasticities of demand for imports and exports. In the same line of argu-
ment, Michel Aglietta (1997) argues that through industrial policy a country will be 
able to introduce technological innovations in production and, hence, increase its 
performance in foreign trade alongside institutional changes that encourage invest-
ment in new technologies. Furthermore, structural competitiveness depends on many 
other factors that revolve around qualitative aspects. Some of these aspects include: 
sectoral specialization and expertise in international trade; the composition and struc-
ture of the firms; the quality of labour relations; the social relationships formed 
within workplaces and the impact they have on the formation of collective forms of 
work organization; the key characteristics of the domestic market; the rate at which 
mechanical equipment is replaced; the types of products in which the country has 
comparative advantage; the reputation of products and many others (Aglietta 1997).  
Despite the differences in the internal devaluation and structural adjustment 
approaches, it is envisaged that it is possible for the existing schools of thought to 
arrive at a consensus by developing a common framework of analysis. However,  
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while the formulation of appropriate mathematical models is feasible, the transforma-
tion of the equations embedded within the models so that they take into account the 
theoretical priorities to which each of the conceptual frameworks attach greater im-
portance is a more daunting challenge. 
 
2.1 From Theory to Reality - The Phases of Internal Devaluation 
 
Potentially, the strategic phases envisaged by the troika according to which the Greek 
economy has to very swiftly go through are as follows: during the first phase, Greece 
is expected to rapidly reduce public deficit and debt levels through cuts in public sec-
tor pay and pensions along with significant reductions in public and social spending - 
without consideration of the devastating negative multiplier effects that these meas-
ures will have on across all sectors of the economy and national employment.  
In the second phase, the troika suggests that subsequent economic recovery 
will come through improvements in the competitive position of the country. To 
achieve this objective, there have to be significant reductions in the minimum wage, 
allowances and pensions, the weakening of existing labour laws, the establishment of 
a private contract as a standard means of employment, a reduction in the power of 
trade unions, the invalidation of collective bargaining agreements, the promotion of 
labour market flexibility, etc.  
The third phase envisages a programme of privatizations in tandem with fur-
ther reductions in the salaries of civil servants, the wages of special payroll profes-
sions such as judges, policemen, university staff etc., the minimum wage, the scrap-
ping of the Christmas and Easter bonuses, and finally the gradual abolition of sever-
ance pay.  
The implementation of this raft of austerity measures will unavoidably have a 
calamitous adverse impact on the disposable income of both employees and retirees 
(which by 2019 is expected to have fallen by 50% in real terms). For comparison 
purposes, it is also worth noting that the GDP per capita in Greece in 2009 was 92% 
of the EU average, whilst in 2011 it plummeted even further reaching only 82% of 
the EU average. This contrasts with the picture in two of the strongest economies of 
the Eurozone - with GDP per capita in France and Germany over the same period 
falling from 108% to 107% and 128% to 120% of the EU average respectively (Eu-
rostat 2012).  
The increased interest in the policies relating to economic austerity has caused 
many researchers to reassess the studies supporting the “expansionary fiscal contrac-
tion” hypothesis. However, these have been largely discredited (IMF 2010; Jaime 
Guajardo, Daniel Leigh, and Andrea Pescatori 2011). In response to the latest finding 
concerning the method used to identify fiscal consolidation - a statistical measure 
that has been found to down-play contractionary and over-state expansionary effects 
- the IMF (2010) re-tested the expansionary austerity hypothesis. The results of this 
re-testing suggest that the short-term effect of fiscal consolidation was contraction-
ary, and could be reduced by cutting interest rates, devaluing the currency and reduc-
ing expenditure rather than increasing taxes. Similar results have also been provided 
by Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti (1997) and Alesina and Silvia Ardagna 
(1998).  
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In the same vein, by revisiting the experiences of Denmark (1982-1986), Ire-
land (1987-1990), Finland (1992-1998) and Sweden (1993-1998), Perotti (2012) 
found that “the results cast doubt on some versions of the ‘expansionary fiscal con-
solidations’ hypothesis and on its applicability to many countries in the current cir-
cumstances” (p. 42). He goes on to conclude that past experience is not a reliable 
guide, arguing that: “Depreciation is not available to EMU members … An expan-
sion based on exports is not available to the world as a whole. A further decline in 
interest rates is unlikely in the current situation and incomes policies are not popular 
nowadays” (p. 42). 
It is hard to see Greece getting back on track in the short-term as a result of 
austerity measures alone, with many commentators arguing that it is going to take 
decades for any problems to be resolved. According to Stephen Kinsella (2012) the 
short-term deflationary impact of austerity measures can be fully absorbed. It is the 
long-run effects that are cause for concern, with economists arguing for a default on 
unsecured debt to coincide with a massive public sector contraction to get the budget 
into balance (Morgan Kelly 2011). 
The most worrying aspect of the current economic developments in the Euro-
zone is the lack of a viable plan to effectively reconstruct the already crippled 
economies. Such a plan would serve as means of deflecting the pernicious effects of 
internal devaluation through mobilization of the productive forces of the economies. 
Sustaining what many commentators regard as these ill-conceived austerity policies 
will only prolong economic stagnation in Greece as government revenues will con-
tinue to dwindle due in the main to unprecedented falls in purchasing power, dispos-
able income and consumer spending. It is in this sense that it is argued that a bold 
and fundamentally different strategic plan is required, aimed at internally recon-
structing the crisis-hit economies, including Greece, through appropriate public and 
private sector investment spending, wage and income redistribution policies as well 
as polices tailored to boost productivity.  
It is imperative, therefore, that an appropriate solidarity funding mechanism, 
headed by the European Investment Bank and coordinated by the ECB, is put in 
place to provide the necessary support to the regions mostly affected by the ongoing 
economic crisis so that any contagion effects are eliminated or minimized. By the 
beginning of 2013, the ECB has channeled the staggering amount of €1 trillion to 
120 European banks. Despite the fact that this extra liquidity has contributed signifi-
cantly to the reduction of short-term interest rates, it has failed nevertheless to pro-
vide the additional stimulus that the productive sectors of the economies require in 
order to reverse the downturn of the economic cycle. As noted earlier, European un-
employment has soared as a result, rising above the 12% mark across the Eurozone 
as whole. Instead, the injection of this liquidity has led to inflated stock market val-
ues while at the same time driving down 10-year government bond yields across 
Europe to historical lows (except in the crisis-hit countries). This reduction in bond 
yields has profound negative implications for pension annuity rates and retirement 
incomes as well as those relying on fixed-incomes linked to the government bond 
market.  
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Given the immense powers that the ECB possesses, it is envisaged to be the 
only institution in Europe that can effectively address the ongoing debt crisis by ei-
ther issuing Eurobonds or by directing money to the distressed economies at a low or 
zero interest rate, thus enabling these economies to gradually reduce their fiscal defi-
cits.  
The roots of the European crisis lie in numerous factors, in particular the in-
stability of the financial system, rather than being directly related to fiscal policy. 
Internal devaluation and austerity policies can only make a recession worse in the 
short-term as government layoffs and wage cuts undermine already weak consumer 
demand, investment, and tax revenues. However, by prolonging and deepening the 
recession, austerity measures and a theoretically flawed policy of internal devalua-
tion inevitably erode the quality and quantity of the human and physical capital stock 
in the worst hit countries - and Greece in particular - resulting in the disease of “hys-
teresis”. 
 
3. Assessing the Economic Impact of Greek Internal Devaluation  
 
Policymakers across Europe have had to wrestle with the harsh reality of the conse-
quences arising from the effects of the longest and deepest recession to hit the region 
since the 1930s. While initially envisaged as an appropriate policy tool to restore 
economic activity, internal devaluation has transpired to be an extremely blunt in-
strument that has yet to deliver the desired outcomes. In view of the recession that is 
still unfolding in some countries, particularly in Greece, we would argue that the cur-
rent policy expedients are no longer capable of ensuring that market forces alone will 
be sufficient to reignite economic activity, as originally hoped. What we have been 
witnessing instead is prolonged depression of economic activity that is accompanied 
by growing social instability, resentment and uncertainty while stirring up fear and 
tensions. 
As mentioned above, the hoped-for success of internal devaluation is predi-
cated on price competitiveness and a growing contribution of exports to GDP 
growth. It is through this channel that the external sector of the economy is expected 
to take over and become the driving force of economic growth. Figure 1 maps out the 
contribution of both exports and imports of goods and services to GDP of Greece up 
to 2012.  
The figure shows that since 2010 exports have contributed very little to GDP 
growth and, in fact, their contribution has even been much lower than the long-term 
average. Therefore, using internal devaluation as a means of creating a more export-
orientated economic model for Greece that will ultimately lead to economic devel-
opment has so far proven to be rather ineffectual.  
As far as the contribution of imports of goods and services to GDP growth is 
concerned, since 2010 there has been a significant reduction in the trade deficit as 
imports have declined drastically in the face of an unprecedented economic contrac-
tion. Not surprisingly, the downturn in imports is mainly attributable to the substan-
tial reduction in domestic demand. Such a development, however, can hardly be re-
garded as a successful change in the structure of the Greek economy, unless the pro-
longed internal devaluation will lead to the consolidation of leaner consumption pat- 
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terns, hence achieving a permanent reduction in imports. But even if this turns out to 
be the case, then it would not constitute a valid reason for triumphalism (on the part 
of the troika), as the end result will be lower standards of living and erratic economic 
growth for many years to come. 
 
 
 
Source: Annual Macro-Economic Database (AMECO). 
 
 
Figure 1  Contribution of Exports and Imports to Greek GDP Growth (% Changes) 
 
Since 2010 a paradigm shift has impacted the Greek economy and its citizens 
as the effects of the process of internal devaluation have materialized. Successive 
reductions in public sector spending and tax increases have been implemented by the 
incumbent Greek government along the lines proposed by the troika. Figure 2 illus-
trates Greek domestic demand over the period 1990-2012. It can be observed that 
domestic demand since the peak in 2008 fell dramatically, reaching almost the de-
mand levels that the economy experienced in 2000.  
In view of the this, it is obvious that prolonging the implementation of the 
same policies will put additional stress on the economy which in the long run will 
have calamitous effects on domestic demand, squeezing it thus further down, to the 
levels last observed in the 1990s.  
Equally dramatic is the reduction in domestic demand in Greece when com-
pared to the 35 most developed countries in the world. More specifically, over the 
period 1996-2009, as shown in Figure 3, domestic demand in Greece grew at a much 
faster pace than the average for the 35 major countries. In the period since then, 
however, the picture has changed dramatically, with Greek domestic demand falling 
sharply - by approximately 20% - to levels below those in 1995.  
Despite the bleak situation facing the economy in the context of internal de-
valuation, some commentators argue that a collapse in demand is a necessary “evil” 
that the economy has to go through in the short run in order to improve its competi-
tive position. In particular, every time the domestic components of demand decline 
GDP will follow suit driving the economy into a deeper recession - without necessar-
ily affecting the level of wages and prices (as Keynes observed, wages and prices 
tend to be “sticky” in the short run). Production adjusts to the new demand levels in 
the short run, whilst wages and prices take much longer to adjust.  
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Source: AMECO Database. 
 
 
Figure 2  Greek Domestic Demand (2000 Prices; € Billions) 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO Database. 
 
 
Figure 3  Greek Domestic Demad Relative to 35 Developed Countries (Constant Prices) 
 
Figure 4 maps out the GDP growth rate of Greece together with the trend over 
the period since 1990. Given that internal devaluation will be pursued for the fore-
seeable future, it is expected that by the end of 2013 real GDP will have declined by 
more than 22% since the start of the crisis in 2007/2008 (European Commission 
2012). It should be stressed that the unfolding dismal long-term prospects for the 
performance of the Greek economy appear to be the bleakest since the early 1970s.  
Figure 5 shows the fluctuations in the level of GDP compared to the group of 
35 most developed countries over the period 1995-2012. It can be observed that the 
cumulative decline in GDP for the recessionary period (2008-2012), is around 20% 
hence cancelling out the progress in economic activity that had been sustained over 
the pre-crisis period.  
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Source: AMECO Database. 
 
 
Figure 4  Greek Gross Domestic Product at Constant Prices (% Changes) 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO Database. 
 
 
Figure 5 Greek GDP Relative to 35 Developed Countries (at Constant Prices) 
 
On the basis of the theoretical underpinnings set out earlier, the main aim that 
policy makers hope to achieve through a process of internal devaluation can be ex-
plained through the impact of recessionary pressures - precipitated by dwindling do-
mestic demand - on the economy, which is expected to have some bearing on the 
existing balance of power between businesses and workers. More specifically, the 
resulting mediocre levels of economic activity will cause unemployment to increase, 
hence shifting the bargaining power from workers and trade unions to employers (as 
illustrated by the Phillips curve). The intensity of this shift depends to a great extent 
on the magnitude of the resulting unemployment rate and the underlying structural 
reforms that are supposed to take place in the labour markets. In other words, the 
efficacy of such a policy alternative is predicated on labour market flexibility (in 
terms of wages and conditions of work) and weakened labour institutions (union 
power). It is though this channel that wages across the economy, public and private 
sectors are expected to fall.   
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According to Stockhammer, Özlem Onaran, and Stefan Edere (2009), how-
ever, a reduction in the wage share of national income by a 1% point leads to a re-
duction in aggregate demand by around 0.2% points of GDP. It is in this sense that 
the Eurozone is a wage-led demand regime, which has far-reaching implications for 
economic policy and growth.  
So far the resulting impact of a policy of internal devaluation on employment 
in Greece has been disastrous. For example, in only a two-year period (2010/2011), 
as illustrated in Figure 6, the level of employment fell by 8.5%, in tandem with a 
10.4% decrease in GDP. At the same time labour productivity dwindled by 2%.   
 
 
Source: AMECO Database. 
 
 
Figure 6  Greek GDP and Employment (% Changes) 
 
During the first four years of the recession (2008-2011), production levels in 
general fell by about 12%. However, it is worth noting that a dramatic decrease in the 
degree of capacity utilization was succeeded by a comparatively smaller reduction in 
the number of employees as well as a concomitant reduction in labour productivity. 
This evidence supports the view that, in the short run, employment levels fall more 
slowly than falls in GDP as a result of declining labour productivity - but this is not 
sustainable in the long run.  
Figure 7 shows that the Greek unemployment rate has more than tripled since 
2008 from just under 8% to around 24% by 2012 - with youth unemployment (16-24 
year olds) exploding to well over 55%. Such an unprecedented increase in unem-
ployment can be attributed to, firstly, the number of workers being laid off and, sec-
ond, to increases in the labour force (i.e. the number of people of working age either 
in work or actively seeking work). In particular, during the period 2009-2012, the 
labour force in Greece increased cumulatively by 0.9% (Greek Institute of Labour 
Studies 2012). 
Prior to the crisis, increases in employment had a positive impact on the work-
force as new employment opportunities attracted more workers to the labour market. 
Conversely, reductions in employment cause discouragement and eventually with-
drawal from the active labour force. In the post-crisis period, however, the losses in 
employment were not accompanied by reductions in the workforce due in the main to  
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the dramatic decrease in the purchasing power of wages. As a result, households 
started looking for additional employment opportunities in an attempt to recoup the 
lost income caused by internal devaluation. 
 
 
Source: AMECO Database. 
 
 
Figure 7  Greek Unemployment Rate (% of Labour Force) 
 
Thus, internal devaluation has had a number of deleterious effects on Greece’s 
economic activity and on the wellbeing of its citizens. So far the implementation of 
the austerity measures has led to an unprecedented decline in consumer and corporate 
spending, the level and growth of GDP, net capital formation, capacity utilization, 
productivity and employment. Furthermore, the dramatic and unprecedented increase 
in unemployment levels has plunged the economy into an even deeper and more pro-
longed recession.  
The reduction in productive capacity and net capital formation has, inevitably, 
resulted in a sharp decline in Greek labour productivity (Figure 8). This has affected 
labour costs per unit of output relative to the 35 reference countries (Figure 9). The 
change in labour cost per unit of output equals the change in nominal gross wages 
minus the change in labour productivity. Therefore, to reduce unit labour costs the 
reduction in the nominal wage rate should be greater than the decrease in labour pro-
ductivity. In other words, the ongoing recession should have caused an increase in 
unemployment and a concomitant reduction in wages to such an extent that it out-
weighs the negative effect that a reduced scale of production has on labour produc-
tivity. The empirical evidence indicates, however, that wages and unit labour costs 
are likely to fall even further relative to many other economies as the crisis is pro-
longed.  
Over the period 2010-2011 the average nominal wage decreased by 6.4% 
compared to 2009, while labour productivity went down by 1.9% (Greek Institute of 
Labour Studies 2012). Therefore, labour costs per unit of output fell by 4.5%. Given 
that the existing policies will be in place for the foreseeable future, the decline in unit 
labour costs is expected to be significant (about 8%) due to the structural reforms that 
are currently taking place in the labour market, i.e. minimum wage reductions, scrap-
ing of sectoral collective agreements etc. (European Commission 2012).  
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Source: AMECO Database. 
 
 
Figure 8  Greek Labour Productivity (% Changes) 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO Database. 
 
 
Figure 9  Greek Unit Labour Costs Relative to 35 Developed Countries 
 
On the basis of the EC projections, investment and exports are expected to be 
the driving forces behind the imminent recovery. For this to happen it is imperative 
that export volumes increase considerably. Additionally, the expected gains from 
decreases in labour costs and structural reforms may not be sufficient to put the bat-
tered Greek economy back on track to recovery if domestic consumption remains 
weak - as is to be expected, given the projected path for wages - and if net exports do 
not compensate for the losses in domestic demand. 
Given that the drop in the government component of aggregate demand is 
much larger than the improvement in the external balance - the government deficit is 
expected to drop to 2.1 % of GDP in 2014, from 7.3 % of GDP in 2012 - the scenario 
implies that the private sector balance turns negative again, with a return to net bor-
rowing by the private sector. At present it is highly unlikely that the Greek private 
sector would be willing to increase its net debt in just two years, given the alarmingly 
high level of unemployment and declining incomes and without any substantial re-
covery in the country’s financial sector. Figure 10 maps out fluctuations in net fixed 
capital formation for the period 1990-2012 which shows a collapse after 2008 - with 
unprecedented reductions in the capital stock of the Greek economy after 2010.  
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Given that fixed capital investment is the main channel through which new technolo-
gies and new ways of organizing production are introduced, it would be sensible to 
expect that the reduction in investment will have adverse effects on labour productiv-
ity. The counter argument to this resides in the “Darwinian” clearance approach on 
the basis of which low productivity firms will be driven out of the market. It is there-
fore through the Schumpeterian process of what is termed as “creative destruction” 
that the new road to performance will eventually be established by the high produc-
tivity firms. In passing, it should be stressed that dwindling aggregate demand im-
plies closures of the least efficient firms in the long term. In the short and medium 
term, however, all firms are negatively affected.  
 
 
 
Source: AMECO Database. 
 
 
Figure 10  Net Fixed Capital Formation (% Changes at Current Prices) 
 
Currently, the major criticism levelled at the way internal devaluation func-
tions revolves around its adverse impact on the components of aggregate demand as 
well as the self-feeding recessionary environment that its policies imply. The emerg-
ing stifling economic environment hinders technological progress as investment in 
fixed capital is discouraged. The resulting negative impact on technology and inno-
vation reduces labour productivity and hence price competitiveness. Thereby, the 
country’s ability to innovate as well as improve its position in the global markets is 
significantly limited as a result of this vicious circle.  
According to Kaldor (1982), Russell Boyer and Pascal Petit (1991) and Mark 
Setterfield (1998), decreasing capital accumulation is cumulative, in the sense that 
once its negative effects are realized, a new period of decline in production, produc-
tivity, employment and investment will set in. The devastating effects on the econ-
omy are what the economy is experiencing currently - mass unemployment, poverty, 
erosion of productive capacity and social tensions. The vicious circle that follows is a 
self-perpetuating cycle of recession and misery that puts paid to any benefits ex-
pected to be reaped from the process of internal devaluation.  
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4. Alternatives to Internal Devaluation 
 
From the theoretical and empirical critical analyses in Sections 2 and 3 above, it is 
clear that the results of internal devaluation have fallen far short of what the troika 
had anticipated with the Greek economy sinking deeper into recession. The existing 
obsession with the implementation of contractionary fiscal policies to reverse the 
economic downturn is unprecedented. The notion that achieving primary surpluses 
through squeezing public sector expenditures combined with increased taxation has 
been shown to be flawed, in the sense that the relentless imposition of restrictive fis-
cal policies on a country already in a recessionary spiral has resulted in a vicious cir-
cle of consolidation followed by contraction that can go on indefinitely. Recently, 
research work conducted by the IMF bolsters up the latter by suggesting that fiscal 
contractions are typically contractionary. The IMF has, belatedly, conceded that the 
magnitude of the negative multiplier effects resulting from fiscal austerity measures 
was underestimated (IMF 2012b). The question now arises as what should be the 
next steps for Greece and its “creditors”? We now explore some of the alternatives to 
the failed policy of internal devaluation and austerity.  
 
An Exit from the Eurozone? 
 
Ever since the onset of the crisis a number of commentators have suggested that exit-
ing the Eurozone might have been the best alternative option for Greece. The con-
stricting jacket of a common currency would be lifted, hence giving way to the cur-
rency devaluation mechanism through which current account deficits are reduced, 
and competitiveness is stimulated. The latter, in conjunction with capital controls and 
investment directed at strategic industries, would galvanize economic growth (Kieran 
Allen 2009; Alex Callinicos 2010; Costas Lapavitsas et al. 2010). In the case of 
Greece, however, the benefits to be gained from abandoning the common currency 
would be outweighed by the envisaged costs. There would be massive capital flight 
and devaluation of the new currency due to a collapse in investor confidence. But, 
paradoxically a prolonged depression might in itself force the economy out of the 
Eurozone.  
 
Expansionary Monetary Policy by the ECB 
 
The ECB has the power to play an instrumental role in lifting the crisis-hit member 
states out of the economic impasse as an alternative to fiscal austerity. One way for 
the ECB to achieve this would be through lowering interest rates as well as through 
further quantitative easing. The resulting higher inflation rate levels in the stronger 
economies (such as Germany) would be equivalent to a real currency appreciation of 
the core economies vis-à-vis the peripheral ones (suffering from deflation), thus ena-
bling the crisis-hit economies to improve their competitive position. In this way, an 
expansionary monetary policy through quantitative easing will reduce substantially 
the burden on the economies in distress by supporting sovereign debt. 
In passing, it should be noted that in 2012 Germany’s net trade deficit was 
€43.4 billion - €27 billion with Russia, Libya, and Norway combined, €4.7 billion 
with Japan and €11.7 billion with China - whilst its trade surplus with the Eurozone’s  
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trade deficit nations (France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus and Ireland) 
amounted to a staggering €54.6 billion. In other words, German global trade sur-
pluses are still being counterbalanced by the deficits of the crisis-hit Eurozone coun-
tries.  
 
Regional and Industrial Policies  
 
We would argue that austerity measures should be relaxed. The contractionary ef-
fects of fiscal policy should be eased and refocused on the reduction of unemploy-
ment by channeling public sector spending to viable and socially desirable invest-
ment projects. At the same time, there is a need for a centrally managed European 
fiscal policy to effectively transfer resources between richer and poorer regions thus 
insulating member states from undesirable economic shocks. Regional and industrial 
policies should be fundamentally reformed and the European Investment Bank, 
through issuing euro bonds, should urgently introduce a major program of invest-
ments, especially in the most crisis-stricken economies of the Southern Region. This 
will provide the leeway required for the distressed economies to slowly get back on 
track to recovery. 
 
Reform of the Financial Sector 
 
Given that the political economy of the advanced countries has been transformed by 
financialisation then the alternative to austerity will require considerably more than 
just a novel policy mix. It is imperative that the existing financial institutions un-
dergo fundamental transformations. The uncontrolled expansion of the financial sec-
tor must be radically reversed. Currently, much of the mainstream debate has focused 
on what to do about the banks. A more radical perspective put forward by Peter Go-
wan (2009) concerns the introduction of “a public utility model”, in which banking 
and credit would be publicly owned and operate under democratic control. 
The separation of traditional core retail and corporate banking activities from 
so-called “casino” banking involving a plethora of speculative and high risk financial 
derivatives should be enforced, alongside appropriate regulation of the operations of 
investment banks, hedge funds and private equity funds. It is therefore envisaged that 
a new model of financial and economic development is needed within which the role 
of public and cooperative commercial banks as a means to providing finance for sus-
tainable investment projects should be reinforced (Erkki Liikanen 2012). This will 
require European-wide consensus and extensive changes in bank regulations.  
In the same line of argument, Yanis Varoufakis and Stuart Holland (2013), in 
an attempt to provide a way out of the current economic crisis, put forward a modest 
proposal on the basis of which efforts should be centered around the creation of a 
Single Banking Area with a single authority that supervises directly and recapitalises 
the area’s banks. In addition they propose that the ECB offers member-states the op-
portunity of a Debt Conversion for their Maastricht Compliant Debt (MCD) but that 
the national shares of the converted debt would continue to be serviced by member-
states. Finally, they propose an Investment-led Recovery and Convergence Program  
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which is fully Europeanised in the sense that it provides investments that are not 
backed by the taxpayers of the surplus countries.  
Finally, having challenged the theoretical and practical implication of a policy 
based on internal devaluation, we argue strongly that the troika must urgently recon-
sider the enforcement of fiscal austerity and fiscal consolidation measures. Currently, 
there is a tendency, especially by politicians and economists subscribing to the neo-
liberal tradition, to treat both concepts as though they have similar meanings. It is 
fundamentally erroneous to equate government finances with accounting alchemies 
of households or firms. Such a simplistic assumption underestimates the adverse im-
pact of the reduction of public expenditure on GDP. In addition, the way govern-
ments manage fiscal policy, public finances and debt will vary according to the ma-
turity of the country in terms of democracy (Abel Fernandes and Paulo Mota 2013). 
Given the existing differences between the northern and southern Eurozone countries 
in terms of political maturity and economic development, it is critical that a more 
versatile and customized approach to dealing with fiscal asymmetries is adopted by 
the member states.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Undoubtedly, the current level of public sector debt in Greece and other peripheral 
economies is unsustainable. Contrary to the expectations of the designers of the aus-
terity package - the so-called troika - the Greek economy continues to be dragged 
into a debt-deflation spiral that has precipitated a devastation of its productive base. 
The case for such aggressive austerity measures has largely been based on the work 
of Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2010) in which they argue that there is a 
strong negative relationship between high gross public debt (as a percentage of GDP) 
and economic growth. However, the significance of this research has been chal-
lenged recently and it has been shown that, while there is indeed a negative relation-
ship between the two variables, it is by no means clear-cut or as significant as 
Reinhart and Rogoff contend (see Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin 
2013). 
It is therefore imperative that a novel alternative approach is devised, the key 
objective of which would be to rapidly draw the economy out of the extant “reces-
sionary quicksand”. In the pursuit of this novel approach we maintain that the follow-
ing key points in conjunction with the preceding analysis have to be considered:  
i) Even though it is not officially acknowledged by the policy makers (for 
whatever reasons, both in Brussels and Greece), trying to reverse the Greek debt is a 
losing battle. As has become apparent, at least amongst prominent scholars of the 
economics profession, the unsustainability of the Greek debt undermines fiscal con-
solidation, financial stability and social cohesion. 
ii) Given the significant impact of financialization on the Greek economy in 
recent decades, the Greek economic system has evolved into a somewhat rigid 
model, and has ignored the reality that the stability and growth of the country has 
traditionally depended on the viability of small and medium enterprises.  
iii) The obsessive adherence to policies promoting internal devaluation as a 
means of restoring competitiveness has dramatically shifted the emphasis of policy,  
832  Constantinos Alexiou and Joseph G. Nellis 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2013, 6, pp. 813-836 
thus jeopardizing the viability of the macroeconomy. The prolonged negative eco-
nomic growth has been a harsh reality that both policy makers in Greece as well as in 
Europe have to contend with. What was once envisaged as an appropriate policy tool 
to restore economic activity, internal devaluation, has transpired to be a rather blunt 
policy alternative that has yet to deliver the hoped-for results. 
An alternative economic approach aimed at emancipating the Greek economy 
from the crisis of the current economic system as well as the defunct ideological “ar-
tifacts” of the neoliberal dogma requires a model that will be based on more prag-
matic assumptions, taking into account the idiosyncratic elements of the Greek econ-
omy. This alternative approach should seek to: a) renegotiate the existing loan 
agreement with the troika; b) establish an employment creation agenda through “em-
ployer of last resort” schemes; c) reconstruct and transform the existing banking sys-
tem; and d) adopt a more flexible and more appropriate approach to the implementa-
tion of austerity and internal devaluation. 
We strongly contend that this approach will give a new lease of life to the 
Greek economy by reactivating the current lethargic economic climate, hence shap-
ing up an economic environment conducive to job creation and economic growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
833  Challenging the Raison d’etre of Internal Devaluation in the Context of the Greek Economy 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2013, 6, pp. 813-836
References  
 
Aglietta, Michel. 1997. Macroeconomie Internationale. Paris: Montchretien. 
Alesina, Alberto, and Robert Perotti. 1997. “The Welfare State and Competitiveness.” 
American Economic Review, 87(5): 921-939. 
Alesina, Alberto, and Silvia Ardagna. 1998. “Tales of Fiscal Adjustment.” Economic 
Policy, 13(27): 487-545. 
Allen, Kieran. 2009. Ireland’s Economic Crash: A Radical Agenda for Change. Dublin: 
Liffey Press. 
Arestis, Philip, and Malcom Sawyer. 2005. “Aggregate Demand, Conflict and Capacity in 
the Inflationary Process.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 29(6): 959-974. 
Bean, Charles. 1998. “The Interaction of Aggregate-Demand Policies and Labour Market 
Reform.” Swedish Economic Policy Review, 5(2): 353-382. 
Bensidoun, Isabelle, Guillaume Gaulier, and Deniz Ünal-Kesenci. 2001. “The Nature of 
Specialization Matters for Growth: An Empirical Investigation.” Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales Working Paper 13. 
Blecker, Robert. 1998. “International Competitiveness, Relative Wages and the Balance of 
Payments Constraint.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 20(4): 495-526. 
Boeri, Tito, Richard Layard, and Stephen Nickell. 2000. “Welfare-To-Work and the Fight 
against Long-Term Unemployment.” Department for Education and Employment 
Research Report 206. 
Boyer, Robert. 2012. “The Four Fallacies of Contemporary Austerity Policies: The Lost 
Keynesian Legacy.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 36(1): 283-312.  
Boyer, Russell, and Pascal Petit. 1991. “Kaldor’s Growth Theories: Past, Present and 
Prospects for the Future.” In Nicholas Kaldor and Mainstream Economics, ed. Edward 
J. Nell and Walter Semmeler, 498-523. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Britto, Gustavo, and John McCombie. 2009. “Thirlwall’s Law and the Long-Term 
Equilibrium Growth Rate: An Application to Brazil.” Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics, 32(1): 115-136. 
Callinicos, Alex. 2010. “Austerity Politics.” International Socialism, 128(2): 3-14. 
Carlin, Wendy, Andrew Glyn, and John Van Reenen. 2001. “Export Market Performance 
of OECD Countries: An Empirical Examination of the Role of Cost Competitiveness.” 
Economic Journal, 111(468): 128-162. 
Dadak, Casimir. 2011. “Political Economy of the Euro Area Crisis.” Panoeconomicus, 58(5): 
593-604. 
De Pinto, Isaac. 1774. An Essay on Circulation and Credit in Four Parts and a Letter on the 
Jealousy of Commerce. London: J. Ridley.  
Driver, Rebecca, and Peter Westaway. 2004. “Concepts of Equilibrium Exchange Rates.” 
Bank of England Working Paper 248. 
European Commission – EC. 2012. “The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for 
Greece.” European Economy Occasional Papers 94.  
Eurostat. 2012. Annual Report. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/esgab/documents/EN_ESGAB%202
012%20report.pdf (accessed April 15, 2013). 
Fagerberg, Jan. 1988. “International Competitiveness.” The Economic Journal, 98(391): 
355-374.   
834  Constantinos Alexiou and Joseph G. Nellis 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2013, 6, pp. 813-836 
Fagerberg, Jan. 1996. “Technology and Competitiveness.” Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 12(3): 39-51. 
Feldstein, Martin. 2012. “Dealing with Our Fiscal Problems.”  
http://www.nber.org/feldstein/SIEPR-3R.pdf. 
Fernandes, Abel, and Paulo Mota. 2013. “The Euro Zone Peripheral Countries’ Sovereign 
Debt Crisis: Also a Case of Non-Mature Democracies?” Panoeconomicus, 60(3): 291-
310. 
Fitoussi, Paul J. 2012. Austerity Non Serve Alla Crescita. Formiche, 1er février 2012. 
Gowan, Peter. 2009. “Crisis in the Heartland.” http://newleftreview.org/II/55/peter-gowan-
crisis-in-the-heartland. 
Greek Institute of Labour Studies. 2012. “Annual Report on the Greek Economy.” 
http://www.inegsee.gr/ereynes-meletes/meletes.html (accessed February 7, 2013). 
Guajardo, Jaime, Daniel Leigh, and Andrea Pescatori. 2011. “Expansionary Austerity: 
New International Evidence.” International Monetary Fund Working Paper 11/158. 
Hall, Peter, and David Soskice. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hansen, Alvin, and Dimitri Papadimitriou. 2012. “Fiscal Traps and Macro Policy after the 
Eurozone Crisis.” Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Public Policy Brief 127. 
Hansen, Jan, and Warner Roeger. 2000. “Estimation of Real Equilibrium Exchange Rates.” 
European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs Economic Papers 144. 
Hatsopoulos, George, Paul Krugman, and Lawrence Summers. 1988. “US 
Competitiveness: Beyond the Trade Deficit.” Science, 241(4863): 299-307. 
Herndon, Thomas, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin. 2013. “Does High Public Debt 
Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff.” Political 
Economy Research Institute Working Paper 322.  
Hume, David. 1752. “Of Public Credit.” In Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, ed. David 
Hume, 39-58. Indianapolis: The Liberty Fund. 
International Monetary Fund – IMF. 1999. “Chronic Unemployment in the Euro Area: 
Causes and Cure.”  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/1999/01/0599ch4.pdf. 
International Monetary Fund – IMF. 2003. “Unemployment and Labour Market 
Institutions: Why Reforms Pay Off.” 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/01/pdf/chapter4.pdf. 
International Monetary Fund – IMF. 2010. “Will It Hurt? Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal 
Concolidation.” http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/pdf/c3.pdf. 
International Monetary Fund – IMF. 2012a. Fiscal Monitor: Balancing Fiscal Policy 
Risks. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
International Monetary Fund – IMF. 2012b. “Will It Hurt? Macroeconomic Effects of 
Fiscal Consolidation.” http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/pdf/c3.pdf. 
Jones, Claire, and Norma Cohen. 2012. “Debate Rages over Benefits of Fiscal Austerity.” 
Financial Times. July 12. 
Kaldor, Nicholas. 1978. “Causes of the Slow Rate of Economic Growth in the United 
Kingdom.” In Further Essays on Economic Theory, ed. Nicholas Kaldor, 100-138. 
New York: Holmes & Meyer. 
Kaldor, Nicholas. 1982. The Scourge of Monetarism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Kelly, Morgan. 2011. “Ireland’s Future Depends on Breaking Free from Bailout.” Irish 
Times. May 7.  
835  Challenging the Raison d’etre of Internal Devaluation in the Context of the Greek Economy 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2013, 6, pp. 813-836
Keynes, John M. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London: 
Macmillan. 
Kinsella, Stephen. 2012. “Is Ireland Really the Role Model for Austerity?” Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 36(1): 223-235. 
Konzelmann, Suzanne J. 2012. “The Economics of Austerity.” University of Cambridge 
Working Paper 434.  
Kregel, Jan. 2012. “Six Lessons from the Euro Crisis.” Levy Economics Institute of Bard 
College Policy Note 2012/10. 
Lapavitsas, Costas, Annina Kaltenbrunner, George Lambrinidis, Duncan Lindo, James 
Meadway, John Michell, Juan P. Painceira, Eugenia Pires, Jeff Powell, Alexis 
Stenfors, and Nuno Teles. 2010. “The Eurozone between Austerity and Default.” 
http://www.researchonmoneyandfinance.org/media/reports/RMF-Eurozone-Austerity-
and-Default.pdf. 
Layard, Richard, Stephen Nickell, and Richard Jackman. 1991. Unemployment. 
Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Layard, Richard, and Stephen Nickell. 1998. “Labour Market Institutions and Economic 
Performance.” Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Papers 407. 
Liikanen, Erkki. 2012. “High-Level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU 
Banking Sector.” http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-
level_expert_group/liikanen-report/final_report_en.pdf. 
Malthus, Thomas. 1836. Principles of Political Economy. London: William Pickering. 
McCombie, John. 1993. “Economic Growth, Trade Interlinkages, and the Balance of 
Payments Constraint.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 15(4): 471-514.  
McCombie, John, and Anthony Thirlwall. 1994. Economic Growth and the Balance of 
Payments Constraint. London: St Martin’s Press. 
Nickell, Stephen. 1998. “Unemployment: Questions and Some Answers.” Economic Journal, 
108(448): 802-816. 
Nickel, Stephen, Luca Nunziata, and Wolfgang Ochel. 2005. “Unemployment in the OECD 
since the 1960s. What Do We Know?” Economic Journal, 115(500): 1-27. 
Papadimitriou, Dimitri, and Randal Wray. 2012. “Euroland’s Original Sin.” Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College Policy Note 2012/8.  
Perotti, Roberto. 2012. “The Austerity Myth: Gain Without Pain?” In Fiscal Policy after the 
Financial Crisis, ed. Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giovazzi, 307-354. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2010. “Growth in a Time of Debt.” American 
Economic Review, 100(2): 573-578. 
Rowthorn, Robert. 1995. “Capital Formation and Unemployment.” Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 11(1): 26-39. 
Smith, Adam. 1776. Of Public Debts’ the Wealth of Nations. London: Methuen & Co. 
Setterfield, Mark. 1998. “History versus Equilibrium: Nicholas Kaldor on Historical Time 
and Economic Theory.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 22(5): 521-537. 
Stockhammer, Engelbert. 2008. “Is the NAIRU Theory a Monetarist, New Keynesian, Post 
Keynesian or a Marxist Theory?” Metroeconomica, 59(3): 479-510.  
836  Constantinos Alexiou and Joseph G. Nellis 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2013, 6, pp. 813-836 
Stockhammer, Engelbert, Özlem Onaran, and Stefan Edere. 2009. “Functional Income 
Distribution and Aggregate Demand in the Euro Area.” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 33(1): 139-159. 
Thirlwall, Anthony. 1979. “The Balance of Payments Constraint as an Explanation of 
International Growth Rate Differences.” Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly 
Review, 128(791): 45-53. 
Uxó, Jorge, Jesus Paúl, and Eladio Febrero. 2011. “Current Account Imbalances in the 
Monetary Union and the Great Recession: Causes and Policies.” Panoeconomicus, 
5(Special Issue): 571-592. 
Varoufakis, Yanis, and Stuart Holland. 2013. “A Modest Proposal for Resolving the 
Eurozone Crisis.” http://varoufakis.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/a-modest-proposal-
for-resolving-the-eurozone-crisis-version-4-0-final1.pdf. 
Williamson, John. 1985. The Exchange Rate System. Revised Edition. Washington, DC: 
Institute for International Economics. 
Williamson, John. 1993. “Exchange Rate Management.” The Economic Journal, 103(416): 
188-197.  
Williamson, John. 2009. “Exchange Rate Economics.” Open Economies Review, 20(1): 123-
146. 
 
 
 